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THREE VERSIONS OF UNIVERSALISM 
Michael J. Murray 
In recent years a number of sophisticated versions of soteriological universal-
ism have appeared in the literature. In this essay I offer some critical retlec-
tions them. In particular, I argue that universalism offers no explanation for 
the fact that God puts human creatures through the earthly life, and that if 
there is no such reason then the earthly life and the evil it contains are both 
gratuitous. Finally, I argue that universalists are obliged to deny that human 
beings have a centrally important feature of human freedom. 
The doctrine of hell is as troubling as any feature of the traditional Christian 
faith. The notion that God would send some of His creatures, all of whom 
He loves, to an eternity of suffering in separation from Him seems to many 
to border on incoherence. As a result, this traditional doctrine has come 
under increasing critical pressure as many philosophers of religion, even 
Christian philosophers of religion, argue that such a doctrine is philosophi-
cally indefensible.' A number of alternative accounts of human eternal des-
tiny have been proposed by these critics/ and foremost among these is the 
doctrine of universalism, i.e., the doctrine that all are ultimately redeemed 
to enjoy perfect communion with God forever. In this paper I offer some 
critical philosophical reflections on the doctrine of universalism. 
Attempts to defend the traditional conception of hell usually come in one 
of two forms. The first consists of arguments by way of revealed theology, 
that is, theological arguments in favor of the view which arise from exposi-
tion of the relevant Biblical texts.' The second consists of attempts to argue 
for the view by defending it against charges of internal inconsistency.4 This 
second strategy often amounts to more of a theodicy or defense of hell than 
it does an argument for advantages of the traditional doctrine over its com-
petitors. In this essay however, I will attempt to argue for the traditional 
view not by arguing for its internal consistency, but by arguing directly 
against what I take to be its most popular competitor, universalism. 
The argument ""rill consist of three parts. I will begin by developing a naive 
version of universalism, one which it appears none has endorsed, but one 
which will allow us to set out some critical apparatus that will be useful later. I 
will then look at two sophisticated variants of the naive version, variants which 
are widely endorsed by universalists. I will then show how these sophisticated 
versions fall prey to difficulties similar to those facing the naive view. 
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Naive Universalism 
As I will use the term here, naive universalism (NU) is the view that 
upon death all persons are instantly transformed by God in such a way that 
they fully desire communion with God and are thus fit for enjoying the 
beatific vision forever. With one possible exception, no one has endorsed 
naive universalism.s Yet, by starting with this view, and raising some objec-
tions against it, it will be easier to motivate the more sophisticated versions 
of universalism and the objections these versions face. 
The Gratuitous Earthly Life 
The first difficulty facing naive universalism (NU) is, somewhat surpris-
ingly, a problem of gratuitous evil. What is surprising about this is that the 
universalist position is usually proposed as a way of solving at least one 
problem of gratuitous evil, the one which (supposedly) arises by way of the 
traditional doctrine of hell.6 And while universalism would solve such a 
problem (if there were one), it raises an equally difficult problem with 
respect to evil in via., i.e., evil experienced by persons (at least) in their earth-
ly life. Most (though not all) theists admit that gratuitous evils, if any there 
be, would present significant difficulties for traditional theism. Thus, it 
would be a serious blow to the universalist scheme if one can show that it 
admits instances of evil which cannot be justified as in some sense a neces-
sary condition for the occurrence of some greater good or prevention of 
some greater evil,. 
For my purposes, we can characterize gratuitous and nongratuitous evil 
more carefully as follows: 
(NGE) An evil E is nongratuitous if, and only if, (a) there exist~, some 
outweighing intrinsic good G such that it was not within God's power 
to achieve G without either permitting E or permitting some other evil 
at least as bad as E and (b) there is not some further intrinsic good G*, 
which is both exclusive of G and greater than G, which could have 
been secured without permitting E or some other evil at least as bad 
as E. 
(GE) An evil E is gratuitous if, and only if, it is not non-gratuitous.7 
We can begin to frame this first problem for NU as follows. On the NU 
picture, all human beings end up in perfect communion with God, enjoying 
the beatific vision forever. This entails, however, that one's fate in eternity is 
entirely independent of the individual choices a person makes and the 
beliefs a person adopts in the earthly phase of their existence. Thus, the evils 
that one experiences in the earthly life are gratuitous. Why, one is led to 
wonder, would God put us through such a pointless exercise, an exercise 
filled with much misery, suffering, and travail, only in the end to invest the 
experience with no ultimate consequences or significance? 
Universalists who reject the traditional view because it seems to include 
gratuitous suffering on the part of the damned thus seem to exchange this 
difficulty for the problem of gratuitous evil in via. While they can dismiss 
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the (supposed) gratuitous evils of hell, they must now account for evils 
experienced in the earthly life. 
The universalist might respond here that earthly evils are not without 
purpose since, contrary to first appearances, they are necessary conditions 
for procuring outweighing goods. However, the universalist continues, the 
outweighing goods in this case are found not in the afterlife, but in the earth-
ly life itself. Thus, while evils in this life do not affect my eternal destiny, 
they do affect the course of the earthly life itself and in this way earthly evils 
have their purpose in bringing about outweighing earthly goods. 
Notice, however, that this response misses the point of the original criti-
cism. While the response offered here shows that the evils in the earthly life 
might satisfy conjunct (a) in the right half of the biconditional (NGE), it fails 
to satisfy conjunct (b). The intrinsic good of the earthly life, on the NU 
scheme, seems outweighed by the good one would have experienced if one 
has been created enjoying perfect communion with God from the begin-
ning. Why would God prefer to have us spend our first seventy or so years 
of existence in this earthly phase, enjoying a measure of intrinsic good but 
with the accompanying evil required to secure it, rather than positioning us 
in such a way that these years are spent in perfect communion with Him in 
heaven? After all, any earthly goods obtained would pale in comparison 
with the goods achieved by spending those years in this way. 
Universalists might instead respond to this objection by claiming that 
their response to the "problem of in via evil" need be no different than that 
of many traditional theists. John Hick, a proponent of universalism, 
responds in this way, arguing that the purpose of earthly evil is to allow the 
possibility of "soul-making.'" In this life we are exposed to evil as a neces-
sary condition for being able to freely cultivate characters that are either vir-
tuous or vicious. And things are no different on the universalist view: evil 
allows us to develop characters that are good or evil. How does the fact that 
all end up in heaven detract from the value of the soul-making experience? 
The proponent of NU might construct an analogy here between the earthly 
life and rites of passage for entering into certain clubs or organizations, such 
as the pledging process for fraternities or two-a-days in the pre-season for 
college football. In both cases, one might argue, the purpose of the rite is to 
develop certain traits in the initiant. The fact that no one, in the end, fails to 
become a member of the group is just irrelevant. Why can't the earthly life 
serve a similar functions with respect to eternity? That is, the earthly life 
serves to develop characters, but all are nonetheless admitted into perfect 
communion with God in the end. 
While there are a number of promising features in such an analogy, the 
disanalogies between these cases and the universalist scheme are telling. No 
doubt, the function of these rites of passage in fraternities and team sports 
serve a certain purpose: something analogous to soul-making. It is the quali-
ties developed during the rite that determine the quality of the experiences 
of future group members. But the outcomes in such cases may vary signifi-
cantly. One might grow to respect and appreciate the coach, or one might 
grow to despise him. Even though the initiants might recognize that some of 
the traits developed are useful for playing the game, they can still love play-
ing the game or hate it. And so, similarly, it seems, if soul-making allows us 
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to develop in an analogous way, similar differences may be found in the 
quality of the experience of those who later enter heaven. Those who have 
cultivated well-ordered characters will enjoy the goods afforded in eternity. 
But what of those who failed to do so? Either they will be "miraculously 
transformed" into lovers of God, or they will spend eternity in the presence 
of God, but be unable to enjoy it. If the former then the evil in via is thor-
oughly gratuitous. But if it is the latter, then there are some for whom exis-
tence in heaven will be tantamount to a life in hell. Those who have cultivat-
ed self-loving characters will not find happiness in being forced to com-
mune with God and so will despise their existence. This alternative seems 
even more suspect since, on their view, heaven is described as a place 
where one finds true well-being and fulfillment in the beatific vision. Notice 
finally that this view backs away from the original position since, according 
to it, there is no instant transformation of the person which makes them 
suited for perfect communion with God. Instead, persons come as they are, 
with the character they have cultivated, and the quality of their experience 
is determined by the character they bring. 
The Denial of "Autonomy" 
This leads us to a second closely related argument against NU which has 
as its focus a certain feature of creaturely freedom. Above I have argued 
that NU entails that nothing in one's earthly existence serves as a necessary 
condition (as described in NGE) for securing perfect communion with God, 
making it and the evil it contains gratuitous. As I noted, this seems to raise a 
troubling problem of evil. But such a view also seems to infringe on a cer-
tain important feature of creaturely freedom since it entails that one's choic-
es have no effect on the outworking of one's destiny. 
It is a commonplace among theists responding to the problem of evil 
that appeal be made to creaturely freedom. Since, creatures are free (in the 
libertarian sense) they have the power to go wrong, and God cannot de-acti-
vate this power without de-activating the creature's freedom. Furthermore, 
it is commonly held that the existence of these free creatures justifies the 
resultant moral evil, since a world with free creatures is on balance better 
because the existence of such creatures permits the possibility of moral 
goods.9 But, as many have noted, it is not mere "freedom of choice" that the 
theist is after with such theodicies. What the theist really needs is a freedom 
of choosing that is expressed in actions that influence the course of events in the 
world. Thus, in addition to the ability to choose in the absence of determin-
ism, the libertarian theist also wants choices that result in significant change 
in the local environment. Let us call this latter feature "autonomy" to distin-
guish it from the mere "freedom of choice" often emphasized by libertari-
ans.lU Thus, a world with "autonomous" creatures is a world where crea-
tures are not only allowed to make evil choices, but choices which issue in 
evil acts and have evil consequences. A world with agents who can choose 
freely but are unable to act autonomously would be a world filled with 
freely choosing brains-in-vats. While free choosing might go on, the choices 
would never have expression in or impact on the local environment, 
whether good or evil. There are, of course, different sorts of effects on the 
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local environment that free choices might have. A presupposition of any 
soul-making style theodicy, is that one of the relevant effects of our actions 
is the strengthening or weakening of our virtues and/or vices. In fact, as 
noted earlier, some theists, including some universalists, think that the 
power to bring about virtues and vices in our character is the very essence 
of human earthly existence. 
George Schlesinger, in his article "The Scope of Human Autonomy"ll 
argues that one problem for universalism is that while it allows freedom of 
choice, it denies autonomy (in the above sense) because eternal outcomes 
do not vary with earthly choices. That is, while it allows human beings to 
make choices, including choices that are relevant for soul-making, it does 
not allow outcomes to vary accordingly, since those who choose to develop 
characters which are self-directed and not God-directed are summarily 
transformed. More broadly we might say that one can choose to cultivate a 
morally vicious character, but in the end one cannot have such a character. 
One can choose to act in such a way as to acquire such a character, but in 
the end one will be unable to effect such a development in character. 
Of course, for God to set us up in this fashion is just to take away the 
autonomy we need for free action to have the significance that makes it 
worth having. One might think about NU by way of the following analogy. 
On the picture proposed by the universalist, it is as if one were to go to the 
drive-through window at a fast food restaurant, make a selection, and 
order. But, no matter what is ordered, the attendant hands over the same 
food. If you order fish, you get a hamburger, if you order ice cream, you get 
a hamburger, if you order a french fries, you get a hamburger .... You are 
welcome to freely choose whatever menu item you like, but at this restau-
rant, you have it their way. And so it is on the universalist picture. You are 
welcome to do whatever you like, but with God, you have it His way. As a 
result, while free choosing may go on in the universalist's world, it is a free 
choosing that is without autonomy, since one is transformed into a lover of 
God, whether one chooses to be such or not. 
One might argue at this point that no one, most of all the one bound for 
hell, would object were God to take away their autonomy in this fashion. 
Who would want the drive-through attendant to give them hell, so to 
speak, even if that is what they ordered? Better to have my autonomy vio-
lated than to have that!12 The universalist might argue that autonomy can 
never be so great a good that it could counter-balance the evil of eternal hell. 
But this may be too quick. As I argued above, significant human freedom 
consists not merely in freedom of choice but also in autonomy. To allow 
free choice without autonomy would be to fill a world with brains-in-vats, 
beings capable of choosing but unable to effect good (or evil) in the world. 
This universalist response seems to admit that there are occasions in which 
we ought to prefer to lose our autonomy rather than experience the conse-
quences of our choices. In fact, universalists seem to hold that God would 
be doing something morally reprehensible were He not to revoke our 
autonomy in such cases. But taking this stand leads to a further conse-
quence the universalist should be reluctant to endorse. 
To see the difficulty, consider the following. As in the case of autonomy 
with respect to eternal destiny, God could have arranged the world in such a 
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way that autonomy is limited in via as well. God could, that is, have 
arranged the world in such a way that we have free choice at all limes, but 
autonomy only in those cases in which the choice we make is morally good.13 
Morally evil choices would be allowed, but they would never be permitted 
to affect the course of events in the world. Let's call such an arrangement 
"limited earthly autonomy." 
For whatever reason, it is clear that God has not set up the world in such 
a way that creatures have limited earthly autonomy. Human autonomy is 
important enough that God has chosen not to revoke it, despite the fact that 
leaving it intact leads to some (significant) measure of moral evil. Since tra-
ditionalist and universalist alike must agree on this point, they must further 
admit that there is some justifiable reason why He has not done so. 
Universalists hold that God allows us to make free choices in matters 
that bear on the outworking of our character, but they also hold that God 
does not allow such choices to have their natural outcome when that 
means becoming an enduringly vicious character, i.e., becoming a person 
who is not fit for perfect communion with God. Thus the "natural" out-
come for those who cultivate a character which precludes the desire to be 
in perfect communion with God, viz., separation from God, is thwarted, 
with the result that only those choices which contribute towards the hav-
ing of a God-loving character have any effect on one's eternal state. Let us 
call this "limited eternal autonomy." The problem for the universalist in 
all of this is as follows. If God is obliged to give free creatures limited eter-
nal autonomy (as most universalists argue), why not limited earthly auton-
omy as well? To put it another way: if, for whatever reason, God deems it 
unfit to grant limited earthly autonomy, why doesn't the same hold, 
mutatis mutandis, for eternal autonomy? Any answer which woulld justify 
one would seem to justify the other. Thus since limited autonomy is not 
found in the earthly arena, we have no reason to think that different prin-
ciples would be at work in the case of eternity.14 
One disanalogy that the universalist might appeal to is the gravity of the 
evil in the two cases. One might say that the consequences of allowing 
"unlimited" autonomy in the case of eternity are more serious than they are 
in the case of earthly affairs. In this life, one can only bring about a limited 
quantity of evil, but to allow unlimited autonomy in eternal affairs would 
be to permit eternal suffering and thus an infinite quantity of suffering! 
Wouldn't this disparity justify God's treating these two cases differently? 
Surely, this is a significant disanalogy between the cases, but not enough to 
undermine the original argument, since an equally convincing case could be 
made in the other direction. One could just as easily contend at this point 
that there is greater justification for limiting earthly autonomy since the evils 
committed in via result in significant suffering being inflicted on other (even 
innocent) people. Wouldn't the obligation be greater to restrict autonomy in 
the case where others are (innocently) harmed than in the case where one is 
allowed only to harm (maybe justly) oneself? How much better then to 
restrict autonomy in the earthly than in the eternal case. And since it is not 
restricted in the earthly case, couldn't one argue, a fortiori, that it would not 
be in the eternal case? 
Thus, the proponent of NU faces two serious difficulties. The first is that 
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such a view seems to undercut the possibility that the earthly life and the 
evils it contains have any significance, thus making the evils of the earthly 
life utterly gratuitous. In addition, the fact that NU obliges God to block the 
consequences, and thus the autonomy, of those who elect to become 
vicious, NU appears to undercut the very feature of freedom that made it 
worth having. And even if the advocate of NU is willing to bite the bullet at 
this point, and deny that autonomy is a good worth preserving at this price, 
it seems utterly inexplicable why God would deny such autonomy with 
respect to eternal consequences, but not with respect to earthly ones. 
Sophisticated Universalism: Part I 
The fact that NU falls prey to such objections might lead one to endorse a 
more sophisticated version of universalism. This version of universalism 
has been defended in the recent literature by Marilyn Adams and Thomas 
Talbott. According to this view, it is simply false that God does or must 
miraculously and utterly transform the vicious at death in order to secure 
universal salvation. Instead, God does not "zap" anyone, as NU proposes; 
God simply permits those who have refused to turn to him by the time of 
their death to continue to exist in other environments, environments in 
which God can progressively strip away their false beliefs or hardness of 
heart. I will call this first version of sophisticated universalism "SUI" 
In discussing SU! I will focus on TalbottY In his view, God can bring 
about this change by progressively making clear to the person that making 
evil choices and having a vicious character is ultimately not in the person's 
true self interest. Once the person clearly understands this, i.e., once the per-
son is, as Talbott puts it, "fully informed" about what they are choosing, 
there can be no possible motives for continuing to do evil and for rejecting 
God. And, since motiveless choices are impossible, the person can thus no 
longer continue to reject God.'" 
A False Presupposition 
One is immediately led to wonder, however, how such a transformation 
is supposed to be guaranteed. Talbott seems to argue that purging false 
beliefs will be sufficient. He says: 
once all ignorance and deception and bondage to desire is removed, 
so that a person is truly "free" to choose, there can no longer be any 
motive for choosing eternal misery for oneself. [7 
By ''bondage to desire" Talbott means having desires which are so over-
whelming that they causally necessitate one's choice of the object of desire. 
Thus, Talbott wants to claim that if one is "fully informed" about one's 
good and furthermore, if one is not causally determined to choose evil by 
one's own affective states, then even a libertarian free agent will infallibly 
choose the good. 
Is this claim true? It depends on what Talbott has in mind when he 
speaks of being "fully informed." He may mean: that one knows all the rel-
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evant facts about the decision being made, and holds no relevant false 
beliefs concerning the decision. On the other hand, he may mean: that one 
knows all the relevant facts and ascribes the proper weight to the things 
known. The latter entails that one has additionally structured one's desires 
so that they properly reflect the importance of what is known. Let's consid-
er the first alternative. 
It seems clear that one can continue to reject God even though one has 
become "fully informed" in the first sense. Tn fact, it is just such an ability 
which allows libertarian agents to exhibit weakness of will. Someone can be 
fully aware of the fact that smoking or having an unhealthy diet or engag-
ing in promiscuous sex is extremely dangerous, and yet, he or she can still 
choose to freely engage in the practices. 
The problem that weakness of will points us towards is this: the fact that 
someone holds all and only true beliefs concerning their good, i.e., is "fully 
informed", does not entail ipso facto, that they will choose to act in accord 
with their true good. As a result, the only way to insure that no will ulti-
mately reject God is to insure that everyone will not only see that true 
human fulfillment consists in perfect communion with God, but will also 
structure their desires accordingly. That is, the only way to insure this out-
come is to insure that people are fully informed in the second sense. The 
problem is, of course, that there seems to be no way to guarantee that peo-
ple are "fully informed" in this second sense unless God is willing to trans-
form miraculously those who see the relevant truths but recalcitrantly con-
tinue to desire to pursue things incompatible with being in perfect commu-
nion with God. As a result, it seems that there is no way to guarantee that 
SUI does not collapse into NU. 
The Oddity of the Earthly Life 
Of course, the above argument does not prove that God must miracu-
lously transform some in the end in order to secure universal salvation, i.e., 
it is not a proof that SUI collapses into NU. It seems epistemically possible 
that all free persons would eventually turn to God in some finite amount of 
time after becoming fully informed (in the first sense described above) 
about their true good. It is worth noting, however, that the fact that the 
Church has affirmed the traditional doctrine of hell with near unanimity 
provides no small evidence for the Christian that this epistemic possibility is 
not in fact a reality. 
Leaving this aside, however, there is a second but related difficulty with 
SUI. The difficulty is by no means a demonstrative refutation, but it raises a 
question the view should answer. Since the earthly life appears to yield 
poor soteriological results, one is led to wonder exactly what purpose it is 
supposed to serve in the outworking of God's plan for His human crea-
tures? Obviously, the post-mortem state in which most turn to God is vastly 
better suited for the conversion of the unregenerate. But if so, why not cre-
ate us all ab initio, in this latter state? Of course, the advocate of SUI may 
argue that this is mere sophistry. It is not that the post-mortem state is quali-
tatively better for bringing about the requisite change of heart in the unre-
generate, it is simply that the time allotted for making such a change in this 
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state is without limit. But if this is right, one wonders why the earthly life is 
so short. Certainly God could have made the earthly phase of our existence 
much longer than it in fact is. After all, there would appear to be significant 
soteriological benefits to be had by allowing the other earthly creatures to 
see that, by the end of their earthly lives, most or all human creatures freely 
embrace a belief in and hope for perfect and eternal communion with God. 
One would think that such nearly universal recognition on the part of 
human creatures in this life would establish such a belief as the social norm. 
The defender of SUI may have no answers to these questions. The lack of 
an answer does not, on its own, serve to undermine the view. But the lack 
of answers would, T think, imply that the earthly phase of human existence 
is an enigma for universalists. It points to the fact that part of the philosoph-
ical plausibility of this non-traditional view hangs on the advocate of SUI 
being able to make sense of the evident truth that God sees fit to start off 
each human existence with a stint in the earthly phase. This fact is both 
strange and unexplained on SUl.'H 
A Different Denial of "Autonomy" 
But there is a third difficulty for SUI. We saw earlier that one problem 
for naive universalism is that it undercuts what I there called autonomy. 
SUI seems to escape the criticism T offered there because on this view, eter-
nal outcomes really do depend on free choices. No one is able to enjoy per-
fect communion with God until it is freely embraced. Thus, on this view it 
appears that autonomy remains fully intact. 
But while SUI does not fall prey to this objection raised against NU, it 
falls prey to a closely related objection. To see this, consider a revised ver-
sion of the drive-through analogy I offered earlier. Once again I drive up to 
the ordering menu and select whatever I please. But in this case, I am not 
given a hamburger regardless of what I order. Instead I am given a ham-
burger, if that is what I order, and if I order something other than a ham-
burger, J am directed to drive back to the menu to order again. This process 
continues until I choose to order a hamburger. Notice here that outcomes 
do vary with choices on this account. Hamburger choosers get hamburgers, 
and non-hamburger choosers get something else. Nonetheless, no one gets 
the very thing they choose, unless they choose the hamburger. So, while the 
trouble that arises for autonomy on NU does not arise here, the autonomy 
that this view offers is still of little, if any, value. While I am able to effect 
various outcomes, I never acquire the outcome I seek unless it is the one 
prescribed for me. Thus, it seems that I have very little power to affect cer-
tain very significant states in the world by my choices after all, specifically, 
those which concern the ultimate state of my character. 
At least one defender of SUI has responded to this analogy by arguing 
that it mischaracterizes the view.''! SUI is not committed to the claim that 
one either chooses to embrace God or is forced to choose again. Instead, the 
one who fails to choose God is led to see that doing so is harmful and 
destructive. As this becomes clear, the one who originally elected to deny 
God is led to accept God freely. Thus, the right way of constructing the 
analogy according to SUl is instead this: if you order a hamburger, this is 
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what you get. But if you order a rotten hamburger, you will get it as well. 
You will then eat it and become sick, and the next time you come up to 
order, you will think twice about ordering a rotten hamburger. Given 
enough episodes, you will eventually stop ordering rotten food. Nothing in 
this analogy points to a diminution of human autonomy. In fact, the view 
highlights our ability to change our choice patterns (and their outcomes) in 
light of previous choices (and their outcomes). 
But contrary to what the defender of SUI claims, it is this redescription 
which mischaracterizes the view. The character of the vicious person who 
wants no part of communion with God, is one that has been cultivated by a 
long series of reflectively made choices. This person has chosen to cultivate 
such a character and as a result has succeeded in acquiring it. To return to 
the analogy once more, it is as if we have a person who ate rotten hamburg-
ers and has now cultivated a taste for them. We puzzle over the fact that 
this person can find satisfaction in eating rotten hamburgers. Nonetheless 
they do, and so they continue to eat them. If all attempts to get the rotten 
hamburger eaters to see that this practice is destructive for them fails, what 
options are left for those who wish to reform their behavior? It appears that 
SUI opts for putting the person back in the queue and forcing them to order 
again. And this process continues until the rotten hamburger lovers finally 
act out of character and order a hamburger that is not rotten. At this point, 
the disposition begins to be eroded. Here the troubling point about autono-
my arises again. In the end, if I choose to cultivate a character which 
includes the disposition to shun communion with God, I will not be 
allowed to become that sort of person. While my choice in the matter 
remains free, my autonomy is ultimately thwarted. 
A defender of SUI might insist, however, that neither of these renderings 
of the analogy accurately characterizes the view. The above analogy, one 
might argue, assumes that rotten hamburger loving dispositions must be 
weakened by forcing the person to choose until he or she chooses contrary to 
those dispositions (that is, by forcing them to eventually choose a non-rotten 
hamburger, contrary to their desires). But, the defender of SUI might contin-
ue, this too is a mischaracterization. The most plausible version of SUI holds 
that human creatures are allowed to choose either to cultivate characters 
which include the desire to embrace communion with God or not. Those 
who do are allowed to enter the beatific vision. Those who do not, are mirac-
ulously unburdened of the dispositions which constitute their vicious char-
acters. They are then allowed to begin to cultivate characters again "from 
scratch." If they choose to embrace communion with God, they are allowed 
to enter the beatific vision; if not, they are again miraculously unburdened of 
their dispositions and allowed to begin cultivating a new character. This 
process continues until each person has freely chosen to embrace commu-
nion with God. Thus, there is no forcing people to choose against their 
desires, as the last version of the analogy hypothesizes. Instead, God breaks 
people of their bondage to evil desires, restores them to true freedom, and 
thereby gives them a new opportunity to pursue their true good?O 
There are a number of objectionable features in this version of SUI. I 
will highlight one here.21 Let us imagine one such person going through 
this process of character-making and -purging. We might imagin{~ that if 
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this person were allowed to go through the process ten times, she would 
choose to embrace communion with God on only the sixth and the ninth 
occasions. According to this version of SUI, however, God allows the 
process to continue only until the person first chooses to cultivate a charac-
ter which includes embracing communion with God, after which the 
process ceases. It is puzzling, however, why the advocate of SUI finds this 
view autonomy preserving. It seems merely arbitrary that God stops the 
process after the sixth cycle rather than the seventh. Why shouldn't we 
assume, for example, that if the person would choose to become vicious in 
eight out of ten cycles this militates in favor of stopping the process after a 
vicious-character generating cycle? 
The defender of this version of SUI might hold, of course, that once one 
chooses to cultivate a God-embracing character, one would continue to do 
so in future cycles. But why should one think such a thing? If the disposi-
tions constitutive of one's character are, on this picture, completely purged 
after each cycle, what provides the guarantee that one will again choose to 
cultivate a God-embracing character in subsequent cycles? 
Thus, it appears that examination of the most obvious variants of SUI 
still yield a view which is not ultimately autonomy preserving. 
Sophisticated Universalism: Part II 
Perhaps, then, the sophisticated universalist ought to abandon the 
hypothesis that God never miraculously transforms the recalcitrant unbe-
liever. In one essay, Marilyn Adams entertains the possibility of God mirac-
ulously transforming those whom it is clear will never freely choose to 
embrace communion with God.22 One might, of course, note that such a 
view amounts to a slightly modified version of NU, and thus hold that it 
fails for the same reason that SU does. 
In the same article, however, Adams makes some remarks that suggest a 
way out of the difficulties posed for NU above.23 Adams argues that it is 
true that the best outcome for each individual would be to choose to 
embrace communion with God freely. But in the case of the recalcitrant 
unbeliever we must ask, what constitutes the second best outcome? The tra-
ditionalist holds that what is second best is to allow that person to retain 
their autonomy by allowing them to be what they have chosen to become, 
viz., someone who wishes not to be in communion with God. But, a sophis-
ticated universalist might continue, why should we believe this? Why not 
instead think that second best entails transforming the person, even if 
against their will? It is, after all, a good thing for there to be persons with 
good character, even if it might be better to have persons with the same 
character who have chosen it freely (or who have freely chosen to have it 
bestowed upon them by the power of grace). 
Someone might illustrate this point by asking us to imagine earthly par-
ents who are watching their child making a choice that will have devastat-
ing consequences.24 The parents might allow the child to make the choice if 
the choice and its bad consequence will end up helping the child in the long 
run. In such cases, it may be better to allow them to make the bad choice. 
But if the bad choice will only be harmful (not to mention eternally destruc-
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tive), no good parent would allow such a choice to be carried out, that is, to 
have its natural consequences. So, some might say, we all agree that it is 
more loving, in such cases, to permit the child to have freedom of choice but 
not autonomy. Likewise, when someone chooses to cultivate a vicious char-
acter, it would be unloving of God to then permit the person to spend eter-
nity apart from God. Thus, if the person fails to accept God freely, God 
miraculously transforms them. Let us call this second version of s,ophisticat-
ed universalism SU2. 
Let me first note that SU2 still falls prey to the "limited earthly autonomy 
objection" posed earlier for NU. But let us leave this aside. The plausibility 
of SU2 hangs crucially on the parent-child analogy. Is it true that the parent 
always blocks the autonomy of the child's choice when the choices will 
yield devastating consequences? It is true that we rightly block the autono-
my of our young children when we see that the choices they make will have 
such consequences. I don't allow my child to toddle out into traffic or to 
drink battery acid. 
Yet when our focus shifts to adult children, the picture changes. If my 
adult son decides to choose a career, a mate, etc. which I believe (or know) 
will be destructive for him, I may counsel him in the strongest terms not to 
do so. But if I were to kidnap him and surgically or chemically alter his 
brain so that he will not choose those things, I would be meddling in a way 
that displayed disrespect for his autonomy as a person, and thus did not 
display love for him at alp5 To interfere in this way would remove his 
autonomy and thus the meaningfulness of his freedom, and this would be to 
undermine both his human dignity and the real purpose of the e.arthly life: 
autonomous soul-making. Thus, it seems that, in fact, love does not clearly 
require miraculous transformation of the recalcitrant unbeliever. 
Conclusion 
The traditional doctrine of hell introduces a number of philosophical ten-
sions for Christian theism. Universalism is currently one of the more fash-
ionable attempts to defuse these tensions. In this essay I have examined the 
most widely defended versions of universalism and argued that each of 
them is open to serious philosophical difficulties which have yet to receive 
attention in the literature. It may well be that these difficulties can be 
defused or mitigated. But until they are addressed, the philosophical plausi-
bility of universalism remains wanting.2b 
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